In recent years the study of the committees involved in the decision-making process of the European Union (EU) has proved to be a very fruitful area of research.
Although their contribution to the overall workload of the Council of the EU (hereafter, the Council) may have been slightly exaggerated, 1 these committees are said to settle approximately two thirds of all the issues on the Council agenda, and in relation to the plethora of functions they perform, they have been described as the 'backbone of the European system of integration ' (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 98) .
This article contributes to the debates on the committees of the Council by analysing one overlooked aspect of their action (Häge 2007; Panke 2010 ) -the links between national officials working in these committees and their capitals. In particular, it explores the micro foundations of national policy, how (and by whom) national positions are prepared. How often do civil servants in Brussels have a mandate? To what extent do they enjoy leeway in their negotiations? What factors explain these dynamics? In spite of some empirical findings that increasingly reveal the important role played by the officials in Brussels (among others, Egeberg et al. 2003; Lewis 1998; , intergovernmental analysis of the Council has generally ignored this relationship. The state is a unitary actor where the national level  Correspondence Address: n.chelotti@ucl.ac.uk determines the position and diplomats in Brussels defend it. Somewhat surprisingly, the literatures on socialisation and on the 'deliberative turn' in EU studies also have failed to take this relation into account, and bracketed the domestic level. If EU committee members are socialised to a certain extent, what impact do these (partial) socialisation processes have on the negotiations of the Council? In other words, does a supranational identity held by individual national officials eventually translate into behavioural changes in states, and how (Zürn and Checkel 2005) ? Similarly, how normative suasion can occur within these groups is unclear and often rests on implicit assumptions. How is it possible to argue that Council committees are arenas where diplomats 'reason, discuss, deliberate and persuade' (Niemann 2006: 468) without exploring the links between them and their capitals? One may even argue that deliberation between representatives is a contradiction in terms (Neyer 2006) . Finally, investigating the control of the capital over their delegates in Brussels appears valuable also from a normative perspective. The growing importance of committees within the Council and the EU raised serious concerns about the transparency and democratic accountability of the decision-making process (Christiansen and Kirchner 2000; Rhinard 2002 ). As Häge puts it (2008: 556) , the more closely national capitals are involved in the elaboration of the mandate, the less of an accountability deficit exists.
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Relying on an original dataset of 138 questionnaires and 20 interviews with national officials participating in the committees of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), this article attempts to partially fill this gap. In this perspective, it also contributes to our knowledge of how EU foreign policy is made. The 'committee turn' in EU studies has only partially addressed the area of foreign policy. If some contributions have examined the historical development of these committees in the CFSP (e.g., Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006) , other analyses have also revealed that national foreign policies are often defined through social interaction in Brussels, and consensus-building is an essential feature of their negotiations (Juncos and Pomorska 2006; 2011; Juncos and Reynolds 2007; Howorth 2010) . This article continues along these lines, by applying the research designs, the methodological instruments and the rigorous testing of hypotheses widely used in the studies of the Council (Quaglia et al. 2008 ) to CFSP/CSDP committees' activities.
The article is organised as follows. The first section clarifies and disentangles the European-national nexus in the preparation of the national position. Three dimensions are distinguished: a) the quantity and quality of the mandate; b) the relevance of the capital for diplomats' activities; and c) the margin of officials' autonomy.
Furthermore, the dataset generated by the research is introduced and methodological issues are considered. The second section presents and discusses the empirical data for the three indicators, which allow us to assess the role of the European and national layers of the national administration in the formulation of the national position. The third section aims at deepening the analysis: the three dimensions are used as dependent variables, and a series of explanatory variables are introduced in order to explain the differences in the governments' control over their diplomats in Brussels.
Finally, the conclusion summarises the main findings and discusses their implications for wider debates about the study of European integration and EU foreign policy.
Links between Brussels and the National Capital
The article explores the links between officials in Brussels and the national capital, to determine the characteristics of their coordination, and to assess their relative power relationship. As mentioned, studies of the Council -which have generated a remarkable amount of data -have rarely investigated these dynamics. Even when this is done, the context remains that of socialisation (Beyers and Trondal 2004; Beyers 2005) ; or the aim is essentially comparative showing the many faces of the EU committee governance (Egeberg et al. 2003) .
At the same time, the literature on EU foreign policy also has paid scarce attention to the European-domestic nexus. Broadly speaking, there are two different perspectives (ideal-types) on the CFSP/CSDP decision-making process. The first approach considers the CFSP as an intergovernmental project (Eliassen 1998; Jones 2007) , where member states attempt to promote their own interests (Allen 1996) , national concerns take precedence, and a 'logic of diversity' prevents relevant agreements to be reached (Hoffmann 1966; Krotz 2009 ). The interplay between the European and domestic level is omitted, and the national capital is -implicitly more than explicitly -assumed to formulate the position, which is then defended and maximised in Brussels by national diplomats. A second, institutional, perspective identifies consensus and problem-solving as key features of EU foreign policy, where solutions to policy problems are found in a collective definition of the issues, and references to European identity and interests and the use of peer pressure are common attributes (M.E. Smith 2004) . The major role is said to be played by national officials in Brussels, who, socialised to European ideas and values, 'see themselves … as policy arbiters' (Tonra 2001: 12) and form a 'diplomatic republic of Europe' (Jorgensen 1997) . EU foreign policy is increasingly Brusselized and formulated by national diplomats in the Belgian capital (Juncos and Pomorska 2011) . The interaction between Brussels and the capital, however, has not been analysed (cf. Juncos and Pomorska 2006 for an exception). Furthermore, these accounts are mostly based on memoirs, unsystematic interviews and authorial insights.
In other words, the micro foundations of the formulation of EU (foreign) policy are still largely left unexplored. Consequently, this article intends to analyse some aspects of the skeleton of the vertical coordination between the national and European layer of the national administration, and to provide the literature on committee governance and on the decision-making process of EU foreign policy with evidence at the micro level.
Three aspects are considered to define the links between Brussels and the capital and to evaluate the practices and logics behind the formulation and negotiation of the national position (Table 1) In order to analyse and test these three dimensions, all assigned a particularly high value (options 5+6) and a further 24.8% attributed a score of four. The domestic oversight appears instead more limited in relation to the level of detail: about 40% agreed that the instructions they received were not detailed and only 7.3% regarded them as extremely detailed (Table 2) . it is highly significant that civil servants do not receive instructions every time they meet to discuss foreign policy issues within the EU. Less than one of three respondents indeed agree that they always have a national mandate, and 26.3% affirm to receive it 'few times' or 'never' (Table 3) . and 'fairly important' is 90.4%). This is unsurprising given that these officials are required to express the national point of view in those settings.
The option 'fairly important', however, was the most frequently selected. The fact that 46.3% chose the second category (and a further 9.6% the third or fourth reply) (Table 4) .
This does not imply that Brussels diplomats play the major part in the CFSP decisionmaking process. Furthermore, allowing a certain degree of freedom is often a rational strategy for member states to achieve their aims -provided that discretion is used to pursue exogenously given national interests -defined and closely monitored by the capital. What the data, however, reveal is that, at minimum, the control of the national level on PRs is not as strong as some intergovernmentalists may think; they also indicate that these civil servants are able to often infuse, and influence, negotiations with their insights and perspectives. Finally, in-depth interviews suggest that, in some circumstances, it is the European branch that determines the negotiating position.
Diplomats who work every day in Brussels 'know the general atmosphere of their own group, and those positions and behaviours that can be accepted and those which are not.' They 'sometimes have to face advices and instructions that are outside of the European logic and also counter-productive.' In these situations, it occurs regularly that 'colleagues call home to report that the initial position is not realistic'
and that in order to reach a (reasonable) consensus, 'it is necessary to change it.' 10 This is more likely to happen when coordination problems within the national administration exist, when the ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs hold conflicting policy stances, or when the issues are so technical that people at home do not have the necessary expertise nor time to analyse them. As a result, 40% of the respondents indicate that convincing their national administration to modify a negotiating position is a recurrent event; cumulatively, 85.6% acknowledge that it has occurred sometimes in the groups they belong to (Table 5) . 
Discussion
All these aspects reveal that the national capital did not disappear, and its control over CFSP/CSDP full-timers is effective, but surely not as tight as often assumed. The two levels are interconnected, and the formulation of the national position appears to be a combined activity. How can we interpret this relationship? A strict interpretation of a Principal-Agent (P-A) approach -on which many (intergovernmental) readings of the Council and the CFSP/CSDP rely -does not seem useful in this context. Identifying a clear 'principal', who elaborates the national preference, and an 'agent', who maximises that preference, is a difficult task (Lewis 1998) . The European level, certainly well connected with the domestic bureaucratic structure, nevertheless enjoys a certain margin of (perceived) autonomy and possibility to advance its own views.
This happens in two ways. First, the experience acquired in Brussels is a necessary element to define the content of the national mandate. The data have shown that Brussels diplomats have not been delegated merely the function to represent and defend the position that is prepared by departments in the capital. The information flow is two-way: 'interaction between the two levels is the key word,' a national official reveals.
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Only 30% claim to always have a mandate; in some cases it happens Not surprisingly, a final query fully confirms the image of a joint decision-making process and blurred boundaries between the national administration and Brussels. Accordingly, the national hold is likely to be stronger in defence policy. However, the data do not support this claim (Table 7) . The statistics show relatively close and/or contrasting values. Instructions are clearer, but less detailed, for CSFP representatives.
If CSDP officials pay more attention to the national level, the negotiating mandate occurs more frequently in the case of foreign policy. Finally, there are not big differences in the (perceived) margins of freedom between the two groups. 
Between Micro and Macro: More Explanatory Variables
The control of the capital on the activities of its officials in Brussels may depend on the individual experiences of the officials themselves: in PRs can use information and knowledge asymmetries to increase their autonomy (Kassim and Peters 2001: 307) . Along similar lines, the same trust and negotiating leeway can be generated by a long overall career in national ministries, foreign embassies and PRs. Junior officials are more likely to be kept on a tight leash by their ministry (Howorth 2010) . The hypotheses can be formulated as follows: the longer the career in European affairs (H1: EU Career), the longer the overall career of a national diplomat (H2: Seniority), the less tight the control of the capital on Brussels will be. 16 On the other hand, some variables at the macro level can be tested to analyse their impact on the domestic oversight of Brussels bureaucrats. First, the level of decentralization and the existence of a multi-level governance within a country can be positively associated with a greater discretion of national officials (H3: Polity). A more decentralised system of preference formation (with a bigger role assigned to PRs) is more easily accepted in a multi-layered constitutional culture (Beyers and Trondal 2004: 928-929) . 17 Second, states that share a widespread consensus on the benefits of a EU foreign policy tend to rely more on their national servants in Brussels; at the same time, more lukewarm countries employ a higher number of officials to better monitor them (Kassim and Peters 2001: 327) . To measure these orientations, two proxies are used: Finally, a last explanatory variable is closely related to the field of international relations and an intergovernmental reading of the CFSP/CSDP. A common (realist) assumption is that the most powerful states have fewer interests in pooling their sovereignty in such a delicate sector, as they are able to conduct independent foreign policies and prefer not to be tied by international/European commitments. As a result, they are expected to give more importance to the control of their own servants in Brussels, whereas smaller states' representatives are likely to enjoy more leeway in their work (H5: Power).
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The five explanatory variables are summarised in 20 considering the data for just 15 countries would seriously limit the research. 
Results
This section presents the results of the regression analyses (Table 9) (Table 10) :
they indicate the effect of a one-unit increase in the independent variables (at their mean) on outcome variables. In particular, as Power is up by one point (from a mean of 7.5), probabilities of always receiving a mandate are expected to increase by almost 3%. Similarly, probabilities of considering the capital as the essential source rise by 3.6% (from a mean of 7.2).
Receiving a negotiating mandate more often, with clearer and more detailed instructions, and more frequently regarding the capital as the essential source of negotiations, is expected to show a strong relationship between military power and the representatives' leeway as well. Being monitored more closely, national servants from larger member states will have less discretion in their activities. The two regressions do not confirm this reading, however: in both cases the relationship is weak and not significant. One other variable explains the relative freedom of CFSP/CSDP diplomats. Running the first regression, it emerges that those diplomats with a long career in the EU are more likely to have more space for manoeuvre than officials with limited experience. As EU career is increased by one point (from a mean of 2.9 years), probabilities of feeling very much restricted by the national mandate decrease by 3.6%. On the other hand, national officials are more likely (by 7.4%) to sustain that they enjoy enough freedom when negotiating in Council committees (from a mean of 4.2 years). Adding Elite and Polity, the relevance of the time spent in EU decision-making is confirmed.
Discussion
The regressions indicate that the relationship between capitals and Brussels can be Notes. Standard errors (adjusted for clusters in Nationality) are reported in parentheses. *p < .05; **p <.01; ***p < .001. One way to take into account the evidence this article has offered would be to make a more nuanced and explicit use of a P-A approach. The capital delegates a much more significant and sensitive function: (part of) the preparation of the national position, and not only its negotiation in Brussels. The domestic level has indeed several incentives to delegate such a function: reducing information asymmetries, economizing on transaction costs, improving the efficiency of the national decisionmaking process and the quality of the policy, etc. -thus saving capital's time and resources. After all, Brussels delegates are national public servants temporarily assigned to national PRs. However, several problems may arise in applying a P-A approach to this intra-bureaucratic delegation. First, the data seem to suggest that the two levels are increasingly blurred: it is often difficult to identify who is the principal and who is the agent. Second, principals should be aware of the act of the delegationor at least, of its consequences and the importance of (credible) control mechanisms.
Arguably, the mandate is the major control mechanism when the capital delegates the function of negotiating a certain policy. However, the design of delegation and control mechanisms is only loosely present when it comes to the (eventual) delegation of the elaboration of the position. Third, most P-A studies consider asymmetries in preferences, and incentive incompatibility, between principal and agents as one of their core features (Miller 2005: 205 ) -which does not necessarily occur in the case of the capital and PRs. Finally, the fact that the most important source of agents' autonomy is not related to the control mechanisms at disposal of the capital (the mandate, for instance), but to the number of years spent in the Council challenges profoundly the validity of a P-A approach (Pollack 2007) . See Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 40. Using more sophisticated data, Häge (2008) calculated that Council working groups and COREPER account respectively for 43% and 22% of the legislative acts, while the remaining 35% is evaluated by ministers. In foreign policy, Juncos and Pomorska (2011) argue that around one third of the issues are discussed by ministers.
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Although the distinction between diplomats in Brussels and their counterparts in the national capital is not as strict and clear-cut as assumed (since the former may be relocated to the home department after the experience in the EU), it is therefore analytically necessary, and empirically, theoretically and normatively justified.
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In order to avoid subsequent criticisms and problems, national delegates in Brussels may occasionally ask to receive an explicit mandate. 4 Leeway/discretion/autonomy are here only loosely defined, and broadly used to evaluate the degree of freedom these officials perceive when negotiating in CFSP/CSDP committees. Although the exact meaning is left to the interviewee, they offer indications of the space of manoeuvre Brussels diplomats may have in the CFSP/CSDP decision-making process in general.
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There are two exceptions. For logistic reasons, national diplomats who are only partially involved in Council negotiations and who reside in the national capital have been excluded. Only full-timers have therefore been considered. The second exception follows the beginning of field research: two specific parties (COREPER II and the Antici Group) replied that their handling of CFSP/CSDP issues was extremely limited. Table not reported.   8   Tables not reported.   9 Interview(6), Belgian official, May 2008.
